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Licenses-Resfricfing Private Rights in Public
Resources*
An experiment of considerable significance is under way at the
Federal Power Commission. The Commission is in the process of
testing' whether it may require applicants for hydroelectric licenses
to accept the following conditions in order to receive a license: ( 1 )
that any person, corporation or government agency may apply to
the Commission for permission to make joint use of the licensee's
facilities; (2) that the Commission may grant such right of use if it
would be in the interest of proper utilization and comprehensive development of the waterway; and (3) that if such permission is
granted the licensee shall receive reasonable compensation, amounting at least to reimbursement for any damages or expenses which
2
the joint use causes it to incur.
The potential importance of such a provision is that it invests the
FPC with continuing authority to appraise the public importance of
the uses being made by the licensee, and, if it deems it desirable, to
force the resource involved to be shifted to another use at a cost
which may be much lower than the market price. In effect the pro* Rumford Falls Power Co., No. 465-A (F.P.C., Sept. 9, 1966). This case is part of
the continuing litigation in Rumford Falls Power Co., 34 F.P.C. 27 (1965), remanded,
355 F.2d 683 (1st Cir. 1966).
1. Rumford Falls Power Co., 34 F.P.C. 27 (1965), 355 F.2d 683 (1st Cir. 1966), on
remand Rumford Falls Power Co., No. 465-A (F.P.C., Sept. 9, 1966).
2. Article 31 of the Rumford Falls license, as amended by the Commission on remand, provides:
On the application of any person, association, corporation, Federal agency,
State or municipality, the Licensee shall, after notice and opportunity for hearing, permit such reasonable use of its reservoirs or other project properties,
including works, lands and water rights, or parts thereof, as may be ordered
by the Commission in the interest of comprehensive development of the waterway or waterways involved and the conservation and utilization of water
resources of the region, for water supply for the purpose of steam-electric,
irrigation, industrial, municipal or similar uses. The Licensee shall receive
reasonable compensation, at least full reimbursement for any damages or
expenses which the joint use causes him to incur, for use of its reservoirs or
other project properties or parts thereof for such purposes, any such compensation to be fixed by the Commission either by approval of an agreement
between the Licensee and the party or parties benefiting or after notice and
opportunity for hearing. Applications shall contain information in sufficient detail to afford a full understanding of the proposed use, including satisfactory
evidence that the applicant possesses necessary water rights pursuant to applicable State law, or a showing of cause why such evidence cannot be concurrently submitted, and a statement as to the relationship of the proposed
use to any State or municipal plans or orders which may have been adopted
with respect to the use of such waters.
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posed provision is a response to the view that the law-because of
the strongly vested property rights it creates-has been responsible
for retarding a needed reallocation of resources, and has thus helped
to perpetuate wasteful uses. Because the FPC proposal is designed
to promote reallocation, both by retaining for the agency the authority to force changes in use and in depressing the price the new user
may have to pay, it provides an interesting opportunity to see how
changes in the kinds of property rights which the law grants will
affect the use made of resources.
Despite the popular notion that legal institutions have retarded a
proper reallocation process, traditional legal theory has been anything but constraining. The theory of public resource disposition has
customarily held that one gets only a right-of-use (rather than "ownership") which will be forfeited unless it is exercised in consonance
with the public interest. While that has been the theory, in practice
there has been no adequate machinery to enforce such limitations.
Thus, for example, when a former commissioner of the Federal
Communications Commission was asked "What happened to the old
idea that you didn't have a property in radio or television, that you
had nothing but a revocable license?", he replied that while this was
still the rule in the law books, in fact "a guy who has a radio or TV
license has just as much permanence as a fee simple deed to the Empire State Building." 3 An analogous situation exists in many other
areas, of which water law is perhaps the best known example; the
courts in water cases solemnly declare that one acquires only a right
to make a beneficial and non-wasteful use, but in fact even quite
profligate uses are hardly ever enjoined.4
The FPC proposal marks an attempt to find a practical way to
implement the traditional, but largely inoperative, theory of resource reallocation. Whether it will succeed remains to be seen; if it
does, a model will be provided for some sweeping changes in the
disposition of public resources. It therefore seems appropriate to
indicate why the FPC proposal may succeed where other attempts
to limit private proprietorship in public resources have failed, and to
suggest some reasons for thinking that it ought to be given a chance
to succeed.
The trouble with traditional attempts to restrict private rights in
3. Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Broadcasting and Government
Regulation in a Free Society 6 (1956).
4. D. Haber & S. Bergen, The Law of Water Allocation in the Eastern United
States 95-139 (1958) ; J. Sax, Water Law: Cases and Commentary 129-30 (1965).

JuLY 1967]

RECENT NATURAL RESOURCES CASES

public resources was that they utilized a rhetoric of limitation so
sweeping that it could not be taken very seriously. The rhetoric implied that the user of public resources was simply a trustee of the
public interest whose right was limited to utilizing the resource in conformity with that interest.' In this high-sounding scheme the public
interest was customarily left undefined. Since that term has no well
understood common meaning, the user was presumably left in a
situation where he undertook to use a public resource, frequently
making a large investment with every expectation of permanence;
despite this, in theory a determination could be made at any time
that his use was no longer consistent with the public interest, and
thereupon the use would be terminated and the entire investment
possibly destroyed without any compensation.
It is easy to see why courts have been reluctant to enforce any
such scheme. The uncompensated destruction of any substantial
economic interest is always strongly resisted; 6 where that destruction is predicated upon a conception as vague as lack of conformity
with "the public interest" the reluctance to interfere becomes understandably intense.
The proposed FPC license provision is intriguing precisely because it attempts to strike a middle position between the virtual absence of restrictions on the users of public resources which we have
5. The classic statement in the law of water rights is that "beneficial use shall be
the basis, the measure, and the limit of the right." 43 U.S.C. § 372 (1964). The following excerpt from an opinion of the Utah Supreme Court is typical of the tone of judicial
language used in dealing with this issue: "No water should run to waste. In this arid
country it becomes increasingly necessary, as the demand for water use increases, to
pay careful attention to the manner of use so as to insure the greatest duty possible for
the quantity of water available. Wasteful methods must be discontinued." In re Water
Rights, 10 Utah 2d 77, 81, 348 P.2d 679, 682 (1960).
The principal exception to this rule is found in the law relating to preferences in
water law. While it is provided that a more beneficial use can displace a less beneficial use, full compensation-such as would be required in a condemnation proceeding
-must be paid to the displaced party. E.g., Idaho Const. art. 15, § 3; Wyo. Stat. Ann.
§ 41-3 (1957) ; Town of Sterling v. Pawnee Ditch Extension Co., 42 Colo. 421, 94 P. 339
(1908).
6. It is probably accurate to say that the only widespread exception is the uncompensated recapture of utility easements in the public right of way. E.g., New Orleans
Gas Light Co. v. Drainage Comm'n, 197 U.S. 453 (1905) ; City of Macon v. Southern
Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 89 Ga. App. 252, 79 S.E.2d 265 (1953). But there are so many
cases which grant compensation that neither result can be said clearly to prevail. E.g.,
City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Co., 251 U.S. 32 (1919) ; City of
Owensboro v. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co., 230 U.S. 58 (1913) ; City of Louisville v.
Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co., 224 U.S. 649 (1912). For a discussion of the navigation
servitude problem see Morreale, Federal Pow.er in Western Waters: The Navigation
Power and the Rule of No Compensation, 3 Natural Resources J. 1 (1963).
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in practice, and the exceedingly broad restrictions which we have in
theory. The Commission apparently seeks to be somewhat more
restrained in attaching strings to public resource users, and thereby
to accomplish more actual control over such uses. There are two
basic ways this can be done. One is to set out in a license certain
specific limitations, such as a requirement that a certain minimum
stream flow be maintained to preserve fish life, or that certain rights
of way must be relinquished to the Government on request. The
propriety of this sort of restriction has already been rather widely
7
litigated, and the FPC has regularly prevailed.
The second device, now at issue in Rumford Falls Power Co. v.
8 is considerably
FPC,
more ambitious. Rather than attempting to
set out in advance those specific future needs which the public interest
might be thought to require of the licensee, it accepts the fact that
the public interest of the future may bring a number of demands
which cannot now be precisely identified. Moreover, it implicitly
recognizes that even if one were to try to identify all the potential
demands of the future, to demand the licensee's uncompensated subordination to them as a condition of obtaining his license would be
to restrict him so severely that a court probably would be unwilling
to implement the restrictions, viewing them as indistinguishable
from the traditional ineffective restrictions in favor of "the public
interest." Thus in Rumford Falls the Commission makes room for
future demand, but provides that whenever such future demand injures the licensee he is entitled to substantial compensation. Undoubtedly this is calculated to soften the double blow of harsh
economic loss and surprise. Under the proposed license provision, a
licensee whose uses are adversely affected is at least given the consolation that making way for the future will not require him to bear
an out-of-pocket loss.
While this may seem an obvious and even rather simplistic sort of
compromise, its significance should not be underestimated. It is one
of the very first acts formally recognizing that our traditional
restrictions have been largely useless. Thus it is a conscious step
away from the widespread practice of disposing of the public re7. FPC v. Idaho Power Co., 344 U.S. 17 (1952) ; Idaho Power Co. v. FPC, 346
F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 957 (1965) ; California v. FPC, 345
F.2d 917 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 941 (1965) ; cf. Portland Gen. Elec. Co.
v. FPC, 328 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1964).
8. 355 F.2d 683 (1st Cir. 1966), on remand Rumford Falls Power Co., No. 465-A
(F.P.C., Sept. 9, 1966).
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source reserve by granting the effective equivalent of fee simple
interests.
How much less than a fee simple the FPC would give its licensees
is not certain. Clearly it will not permit the current user to be displaced without payment of some compensation. The precise measure
of that compensation remains to be determined, but it seems that the
Commission contemplates payment of something less than would be
required as just compensation if the user had the equivalent of a full
fee simple interest. As a minimum, it requires only "that the licensee
at least be made whole for any damages or expenses which the joint
use causes him to incur." 9 The FPC's notion seems to be that upon
reallocation a present user should be entitled as of right to no more
than a return of his actual expenditure, as opposed to what he-as a
fee owner-might have been able to extract from a buyer in the
marketplace.
If this is what the FPC has in mind, it is a most interesting compromise. It says to one who undertakes to use a public resource that
he will have at least this protection for his proposed investment:
while he is using the public resource he will be enabled to produce a
reasonable return of current income on his investment; if the Government decides to displace him, he will be assured a full return of
his actual dollar outlay. On the other hand, it seems clearly intended
that he will not be entitled to receive the full market value of the
public resource.'
If such a scheme works, it will permit the public to secure for itself the benefit of enhanced opportunities to have the resource reallocated to uses thought to be more desirable at a forced reduction in
9. Rumford Falls Power Co., No. 465-A at 4 (F.P.C., Sept. 9, 1966). It is contemplated that something more than this minimum would in some circumstances be appropriate. The example the Commission gives is "when an electric utility proposes to
use another utility's project reservoir for cooling water for a steam-electric plant. Such
use could result in considerable savings to the joint user. It seems doubtful to us that
the joint user should be the exclusive beneficiary of the savings. We believe that he
might properly be required to make a payment in addition to the licensee's damages
and expenses." Id. at 5. But there is clearly no notion that in every case damages
equivalent to those required in eminent domain law would be paid the licensee.
10. In speaking of compensation, there may appear to be confusion as to whether
the licensee is to be reimbursed for the value of his structures and project works, or
for the market value of the water resource. The license provision speaks in terms of
the works and structures, but it should be understood that as a practical matter the
market value of these interests commonly reflects their proximity to, or right to the use
of, the public resource involved. Sax, Selling Reclamation Water Rights: A Case Study
in Federal Subsidy Policy, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 13 (1965).
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reallocation cost. Clearly the lower the cost of change, the greater
the number of potential users who will be in a position realistically to
apply for joint use; surely enlarging the available alternatives in
this way produces a desirable public benefit. At the same time the
public encourages private users to utilize resources by giving them
the opportunity to produce current income from the use of the
resource and guaranteeing them against loss of their investment.
The net result, hopefully, is adequate incentive to promote use
without undue constraint of changes in use as public needs change.
To the extent that the preceding is an accurate appraisal of the
FPC plan, it seems an ingenious and useful attempt to mediate practicably between the traditional giveaway of the public domain and
visionary attempts to promote private investment with the promise
of nothing more than some vague sort of license revocable at the
will of the state. It is an experiment well worth watching.
JOSEPH
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